Reflection: Mapping Neurotransmitter Effects to a Model of Phenomenology

Prior to my current job, which I now serve in my fifth year, I never really had an opportunity to challenge myself on the micro-management of excitation and anxiety*. The reason is, most of my multi-year projects since the 1990s have been carried out in a mode where I recognise an opportunity for personal profit in the world, and then I work against parameters of resistance largely defined by those around me. It's usually been a unilateral assault.
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Whereas on the current project I am largely in control of which parameters of resistance my teams do and do not work against on a monthly, daily, and minutely basis. So about half my time is spent reminding myself [not to be more than 55% sure about any target on any timeframe (Rule 1)], and the other half of my time is spent being as productive as I can without compromising Rule 1.
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In my fourth year of working in this role, after several campaigns which set me to all kinds of work with various c*unterparties over that period, I found myself quite disturbed. I think the development of symptoms of borderline personality disorder (perhaps more accurately framed as a general cognitive decoherence) should be expected, given that I work to actively discourage myself of surety about anything whatsoever.
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I think it's a good time now to spend a few days improving my recognition of excitation versus anxiety on a minutely basis, based on the firm definitions below. Then, once a useful dichotomy has been retrained into my intuition, I should then more closely study the dynamics of that system based on the model below.
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* For the purpose of this post, I'll use the rough model that excitation can be quantified as rates of change in memory buffers for conscious sensation, recognised from the peripheral nervous system, or from imaginative generation (including memory); and anxiety can be quantified as frequency of pausing during any cognitive task - perhaps mappable to dopamine and serotonin respectively.

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Update, 2019-12-24:
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Time to integrate this a little bit with some of my earlier models. Let's look again at the working definition of the dichotomy of states in memory buffers, 'static data' versus 'changing data'. In the mid-2000s, I used to monitor my conscious buffers, and look for those patterns originating from my sensory nervous signals, and I used to try and map them to whatever my motor nervous signals were doing at the time. If efferent/centrifugal/motor signals are not changing, then afferent/centripetal/sensed signals tend to be less dynamic also (tentatively, I associated that with my understanding of what Chinese traditional kinesthesiology might refer to as 'yang' mode); and the converse is true (tentatively, I had previously built a model associating that with the terminology of 'yin' mode).
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(Note that efferent signals can be sent to the virtual space of the imagination instead of the motor system - but that's a separate pathway for discussion.)
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So let's attempt integration of the two working languages/models.
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Category A:
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• 'excitation',
• 'changes are happening in conscious memory buffers',
• 'dynamic data in field',
• 'high degree of information transfer in the pathway: CNS -> efferent -> afferent -> CNS',
• 'some kinesthesiology traditions may refer to this as "yin" activity'

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Category B:
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• 'anxiety',
• 'conscious memory buffers are not changing',
• 'static data in field',
• 'low degree of information transfer in the pathway: CNS -> efferent -> afferent -> CNS',
• 'some kinesthesiology traditions may refer to this as "yang" activity'

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I've not checked this model of integration for coherence, so it'll serve simply as a back of napkin scribble, for now.